William & Mary Law Review
Volume 3 (1961-1962)
Issue 2

Article 9

March 1962

Freedom of Religion: Recent Sunday Closing Laws Cases
John E. Donaldson
William & Mary Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Fourteenth
Amendment Commons

Repository Citation
John E. Donaldson, Freedom of Religion: Recent Sunday Closing Laws Cases, 3 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 384 (1962), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol3/iss2/9
Copyright c 1962 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

3:384

FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND THE RECENT
SUNDAY CLOSING LAWS CASES
JOHN

E.

DONALDSON

Freedom of religion as a constitutional right has its basis
in the First Amendment, which also guarantees the freedoms
of speech, press and assembly.' These liberties are so fundamental that the prohibitions upon Congress imposed by the
First Amendment are held applicable to the States under the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 The
unique significance of these liberties as a limitation on governmental activity was well expressed in West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette,3 where the Supreme Court of the United
States, in overruling Minersville v. Gobitis and invalidating a
West Virginia law, which in its application required a Jehovah's
Witness to salute the flag or risk expulsion from public school,
said:
The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it also collides with the principles of the First, is much more definite than the test when
only the Fourteenth Amendment is involved. Much of
the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when
the specific prohibitions of the First become its standard.
The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public
utility may well include, so far as the due process test is
concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a
legislature may have a "rational basis" for adopting. But
freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of
worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds.
They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave
and immediate danger to interests which the States may
lawfully protect. 4
1 The First Amendment is as follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting

an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people to peaceably assembly, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."
2 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
3 319 U. S. 624 (1943).

4 Id. at 639.
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Thus under the reasoning of the Barnette case, First
Amendment liberties in terms of due process requirements
are unique, and a State may not transgress them merely by
virtue of the existence of a "rational basis" for so doing.
More is required than this, and the requirement is stated in
terms of a "grave and immediate danger" test. In the language
of the Court in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, "Freedom of press,
freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred
position. '
Freedom of religion as guaranteed under the First Amendment encompasses two specific rights, which are apparent from
the express language of the Amendment. First, each person
has the right that no religion be preferred by the government
over others, that there be no laws "respecting the establishment of a religion." Secondly, each person has the right to
the free exercise of religion, for laws forbidding the free
exercise of religion are proscribed. Does freedom of religion,
encompassing as it does the two specific rights mentioned
above, still enjoy the same high regard by the Supreme Court
that it did in the Barnette case?
In the summer of 1961 the Supreme Court decided the
cases of McGowan v. State of Maryland,o Braunfeld v. Brown,7
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts,8 and
Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley. 9 These cases
involved the validity of the Sunday dosing laws of Maryland,
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, and in sustaining these laws
the Court employed reasoning from which it is evident that
freedom of religion encompasses less today than it did at the
time of the Barnette case. Of the four cases decided, McGowan and Braunfeld are of greater importance because of
the lengthy treatment given to the religious issues. Gallagher
and Two Guys follow the reasoning of these cases on the religious issues and reach the same result. In McGowan the
319 U. S. 105, 115 (1943).
0 366 U. S.420 (1961).
5

7 366 U. S.599 (1961).

8 366 U. S.617 (1961).
9 366 U. S.582 (1961).
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appellants, inasmuch as they did not allege an abridgement
of the free exercise of their religion, did not have the standing
to raise that issue. 10 The Court consequently expended most
of its efforts on the establishment question. In Braunfeld the
appellants were Jewish and thus had standing to raise the free
exercise issue. Consequently the Court dealt with this issue
extensively and adopted the reasoning of the McGowan
case on the establishment question. In these latter cases
the Court decided that the dosing laws in question were not
laws respecting the establishment of religion and that as
applied to a Jew or Sabbatarian they did not prohibit the free
exercise of religion.
Purposes of Sunday Closing Laws
Before resolving the constitutional issues presented by
the dosing laws the Court went into a lengthy study of the
history of the dosing laws. Although finding that the laws
were dearly religious in origin and were manifestly designed
to aid Christianity, the Court found that the laws, interpreted
in the light of present legislative purposes, are designed to
establish
... a day of community tranquility, respite and recreation,
a day when the atmosphere is one of calm and relaxation
rather than one of commercialism, as it is during the
other six days of the week."

The Court thus found a secular purpose in the laws. It then
found that the laws were devoid of any religious purposes.
It is difficult to reconcile this conclusion with the obvious
fact that these laws are well received by the Christians who
constitute a majority in most political subdivisions, and to
whom the legislatures are principally answerable. The Maryland statute in question is of significance in this regard. By
its express provisions certain activities otherwise prohibited,
are permitted on Sunday afternoons and late evenings. 2
It seems more than coincidental that Christian church services
are held before noon and in the early evening on Sundays.
10 366 U. S. 420, 429 (1961).
"1366 U. S. 599, 602 (1961).
12 366 U. S. 420, 445 (1961).
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Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion, had this to say
of the conclusion reached by the majority:
The Court picks and chooses language from various
decisions to bolster its conclusion that these Sunday
laws in the modern setting are "civil regulations." No
matter how much is written, no matter what is said, the
parentage of these laws is the Fourth Commandment; and
they serve and satisfy the religious predispositions of our
Christian communities. After all, the labels a State places
on its laws are not binding on us when we are confronted
with a constitutional decision. We reach our own conclusion as to character, effect, and practical operation of
the regulation in determining its constitutionality. 13
Although the latest decisions from Maryland and Pennsylvania find no religious purpose to the closing laws, language
used by the high courts in these States in fairly recent years
indicate that Douglas' analysis may well be correct. The
following is the language of an earlier Maryland decision:
It is undoubtedly true that rest from secular employment on Sunday does have a tendency to foster and encourage the Christian religion, of all sects and denominations that observe that day, as rest from work and ordinary
occupation enables many to engage in public worship
who probably would not otherwise do so. But it would
scarcely be asked of a court, in what professes to be a
Christian land, to declare a law unconstitutional because
it requires rest from bodily labor on Sunday, except works
of necessity and charity, and thereby promotes the cause
of Christianity. If the Christian religion is, incidentally or
otherwise, benefited or fostered by having this day of
rest (as it undoubtedly is), there is all the more reason for
the enforcement of laws that help to preserve it. 14
The language of a fairly recent decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in a dosing law case is as follows:
13 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 572 (1961).
14 Judefind v. State, 78 Md. 510, 515-6, 28 AtL 405-7 (1894).
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Christianity is a part of the common law of Pennsylvania . . . and its people are Christian people. Sunday is
the holy day among Christians., 5
It is significant that the latest case 1 6 on the closing laws
decided by the Supreme Court of Maryland specifically relied
17
upon and quoted the passage from the above Maryland case.
Whether or not the Sunday dosing laws are completely
devoid of religious purposes is a matter of fact. It is difficult
to understand how the Court resolved the question as it did.
The Court makes dear the point that the laws in question
were sustained only because they had no religious purpose. 1 8
It seems implicit in the Court's treatment of the cases that the
slightest degree of religious purpose to a Sunday closing law
would be sufficient to invalidate it.
Establishment of Religion
With respect to the establishment of religion, appellants
in the four cases contended that the laws were unconstitutional
because they dearly gave encouragement to Christianity by
promoting the attendance of marginal church-goers, and that
as a consequence of this Christianity was preferred over other
religions which observed a different day of rest. Furthermore, the enforcement of the laws would be directly prejudicial to Jews and Sabbatarians in seeking new followers
because of the economic burden that would be imposed upon
their potential adherents by virtue of their having to forego
a day of employment each week. 1 9 Having found no religious
purposes in the laws in question and having found a valid
secular purpose present, the Court resolved the establishment
issue in the following words:
. . . the "Establishment" Clause does not ban federal or
state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely
15 Commonwealth ex rel. v. American Baseball Club, 290 Pa. 136, 143, 138
Ad. 497, 499 (1927).
16 McGowan v. State, 220 Md. 117, 151 A.2d 156 (1959).
17 Judefind v. State, 78 Md. 510, 28 Ad. 405 (1894).
18 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 449, 453 (1961).
19 1d. at 431.
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happens to harmonize with the tenets of some or all
religions.20

The Court points out that the mere fact that murder is
forbidden by all religions does not prevent the State from
illegalizing it, and the mere fact that most religions forbid
polygamy does not prohibit the State from illegalizing that
practice. 2 1 Consequently, the Court reasons, the mere fact
that the predominant religions in this country admonish
their adherents to observe Sunday as a day of rest should not
prevent a State in promoting its secular purposes from proscribing unnecessary commercial activity on Sundays.
However, for the purpose of determining the validity of
the Sunday dosing laws it is difficult to draw assistance from
analogies with murder and polygamy. Both of these proscribed activities are manifestly contrary to the social and moral
order upon which our society is based, and a failure to enact
and enforce laws against such evils would jeopardize the
stability of our civilization. Such would not be the consequence of a failure to proscribe unnecessary work on Sundays.
Also, forbidding of murder has no effect on the strength or
growth of religions, nor does it favor one over another. Laws
against polygamy, while they may operate adversely against
some groups with respect to dogma, do not appear to have
any substantial effect on the quest for new adherents by these
groups. Regardless of considerations of purpose or intent,
the Sunday dosing laws in their operation and effect give
encouragement to those religions that observe Sunday as a
day of rest and because of the economic burden imposed,
adversely affect Jews and Sabbatarians in their attempts to
keep their present memberships and gain new adherents.
Laws against murder and polygamy are dearly allowable
under the "grave and immediate danger" test set forth in
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette.22 The sustaining
of Sunday dosing laws designed to provide the conveniences
of a common day of rest seem to be a dear departure from that
test. The McGowan case seems to say that freedom of religion
20 Id. at 442.

21 Ibid., relying on Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1878).
22 Supra, note 4.
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with respect to the establishment clause of the First Amendment means only that a legislature may not intentionally
prefer one religion over another. Was it the intent of the
framers of the First Amendment to insure that no religion be
given a preferred status by governmental activity, or was it
their intent that government should not intentionally prefer
one religion over another? The Court, as to the establishment
clause, discounts the effect of legislation on religions and
looks only to intent. It is little consolation to religions receiving discriminatory treatment that they are being injured
unintentionally. They are injured just the same.
Free Exercise of Religion
In Braunfeld v. Brown23 the appellants were members of
the Orthodox Jewish faith, who by the tenets of their religion,
were required to forego commercial activity from nightfall
Friday to nightfall Saturday. Braunfeld was a retail merchant
who sold clothing and home furnishings, and under the
Pennsylvania closing law the sale of such goods on Sundays
was illegal. 2 4 In a criminal proceeding for violating the statute
he challenged its constitutionality on the ground that, among
other things, it prohibited the free exercise of his religion
as guaranteed under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Braunfeld argued that because the statute required him to
refrain from business activity on Sundays, and because his
religion required him to refrain from business activity on
Saturdays, the enforcement of the statute against him would
impose a severe economic burden and would in effect compel
him to choose between adhering to a basic requirement of
his faith and enduring financial loss. 25 In effect, he argued that
the closing law, imposing as it did an economic burden upon
him if he should remain strong in his faith, was a law forbidding the free exercise of religion.
The Court's manner of overcoming this argument is
interesting. The Court first says
... the statute at bar does not make unlawful any religious
practices of appellants; the Sunday law simply regulates

23 366 U. S. 599 (1961).
24 Ibid.
25 Id. at 601.
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a secular activity and, as applied to appellants, operates
so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs more
expensive. Furthermore, the law's effect does not inconvenience all members of the Orthodox Jewish faith but
only those who believe it necessary to work on Sunday.. . 26
Arguing that the statute in question merely proscribes activities permitted but not required by the religion of appellants,
the Court concludes that although the dosing laws adversely
affect appellants in the free exercise of their religion, the
effect is merely indirect. The rationale of the Court's finding
in this regard is contained in the following language:
To strike down without the most critical scrutiny,
legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the
exercise of religion, i. e., legislation which does not make
unlawful the religious practice itself, would radically
restrict the operating latitude of the legislature. 27
Having established that the statute has only an indirect
effect on the free exercise of appellants' religion, the Court
proceeds to show that on occasion laws having a direct effect
on religion have been sustained. Examples are laws prohibiting
polygamy2s and laws forbidding minors to sell publications
on the streets, 2 9 the latter being applied to Jehovah's Witnesses.
It should be noted that religious practices involved in these
examples affect areas where the State has a vital concern.
The protection of the home and the safeguarding of minors
from the evils of labor have long been recognized as important
concerns of legislatures. No valid analogy can be drawn
between the evils of polygamy and child labor and the evils
of permitting a Sabbatarian to work on Sundays. There is
nothing inherently evil in working on Sundays.
Two earlier cases decided by the Supreme Court have a
direct bearing on the question of how far a State may go in
enacting laws whose effect it is to impose economic
26 Id.

at 605.

27td. at
28

606.

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1878).

29

Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1943).
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burdens on the free exercise of religion. In Follette v. Town of
McCormick3o and Murdock v. Pennsylvania31 the validity of
ordinances requiring the payment of license taxes by door to
door sellers of tracts, booklets and other publications was
drawn in question, and as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses, the
Court held them unconstitutional as tending to prohibit the
free exercise of religion. In the 1961 cases the Court took
cognizance of these license cases, but held them inapplicable
to the Sunday dosing laws in question. The Court distinguished the license cases by finding that the purpose of the
taxes was to raise revenue, and revenue could be reasonably
raised by other alternatives. 32 The Court also found that with
respect to the purposes behind the closing laws, no other
alternatives were reasonable. However in neither Follette v.
Town of McCormick nor Murdock v. Pennsylvania did the Court
state that the license taxes were invalid because other means
of raising revenue were available. Instead, the rationale of
the decision was that the taxes imposed a burden that prohibited the free exercise of religion.
The disposition of the license tax cases as precedents by
the Court is less than satisfactory. The license tax in the
Follette case was fifteen dollars annually.33 If the burden of
such a tax tends to prohibit the free exercise of religion, it
would seem that a law requiring a person to forego a full
day's employment each week so that he may observe his
religion on a day other than Sunday prohibits the free exercise
of religion.
Having proceeded thus far, the Court then lays down the
following test for determining when a law prohibits the free
exercise of religion:
. . . If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the
observance of one or all religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized
as being only indirect. But if the State regulates conduct
30 321 U. S. 573 (1944).
31
32

319 U. S. 105 (1943).
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 607 (1961).

33 321 U. S. 573, 574 (1944).
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by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose or
effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals,
the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance, unless the State may accomplish its purpose
by means which do not impose such a burden. 34
Applying this test, the Court held that the Sunday dosing
law of Pennsylvania did not prohibit the free exercise of
religion in a constitutional sense, for the purpose and effect
of the law tended to advance the State's secular goals, and no
alternative method was available to achieve these goals.
Appellants in the Braunfeld case argued that a reasonable
alternative was available in that exceptions could be made for
those whose religious beliefs called for the observance of a
day of rest other than Sunday. They pointed out that most
states having dosing laws excepted from the operation of the
laws those persons who observe a day of rest other than
Sunday. 3.5 The Court dismissed this reasoning on the grounds
that a state could find that such an exception would hinder
the achievement of the desired purpose, a universal day of
rest, and that it would make enforcement more difficult. 3 6
In examining the test laid down by the Court it should be
noted that it is stated in terms of general laws aimed at secular
goals. The Court in stating the test does not say that the goals
must be important or that the evils at which the legislation is
aimed must be grave and imminent. It does not say that a
balance must be drawn between the value of the state's goals
and the value of preserving inviolate the free exercise of religion. It imposes no dear and present danger test. It says
instead that if a state has a secular goal and has only one
reasonable method of achieving it, a law designed to accomplish that goal will be sustained even though it imposes
an indirect burden on the free exercise of religion.
Conclusion
From the above discussion it can be seen that there has
been a distinct and significant departure from the "grave and
34

Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 607 (1961).

35

Id. at 608.

36 Ibid.
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imminent danger" test set forth in the Barnette case. This
departure has resulted from an emphasis on intent as the
criteria for determining when the establishment clause has
been violated, and the finding that where there is no intent
to prefer one religion over another, the mere fact that the
operation and effect of a statute puts a religion in a preferred
position is not sufficient to invalidate it. As to the free exercise
clause, the departure has resulted from a classification of
burdens on religion into direct and indirect, a discounting of
the significance of indirect burdens where there is no intent
to burden and a finding that if the law is aimed at a valid
secular goal and no other reasonable alternative is available
to achieve the goal, the law will be sustained.
It is significant that the Court, in determining the validity
of state regulations that are alleged to burden interstate
commerce, do not ask if the burden is direct or indirect, or
even if there is an intent to burden interstate commerce or to
prefer intrastate commerce. 3 7 The court asks only if interstate
commerce is burdened. Why should the protection afforded
interstate commerce be greater than the protection afforded
freedom of religion under the First Amendment? It would
seem that the proper test for determining whether the First
Amendment guarantees of religious liberty have been violated would be to determine solely if a burden is imposed or
a religion preferred, and if such a burden or preference is
found, to balance the evil of the burden or preference with the
need to eliminate the evils at which the legislation is directed.
If religious freedom is to be sacrificed, it should be only
when necessitated by public exigencies. There is no such
exigency calling for dosing laws that tend to prohibit the free
exercise of religion and to give certain religions preferred
treatment.
37

Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U. S. 520 (1959).

